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Abstract 
Financial institutions face various cyclical risks, but very few studies have analyzed the cyclicality of 
operational risk. External fraud is an important operational risk faced by insurers. In this research, we 
analyze the empirical relationship between insurance fraud and business cycle and we concentrate our 
study on two insurance contracts that may create an incentive to defraud. We find that residual insurance 
fraud exists both in the contract with replacement cost endorsement and the contract with no-deductible 
endorsement in the Taiwan automobile theft insurance market. These results are consistent with previous 
literature on the relationship between fraud activity and non-optimal insurance contracting. We also show 
that the severity of insurance fraud is countercyclical. Fraud is stimulated during periods of recession and 
mitigated during periods of expansion. Although this last result seems intuitive, our contribution is the first 
to measure its significance. 
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Does insurance fraud in automobile theft insurance fluctuate 
with the business cycle? 
 
Operational risk has become an important source of risk for banks and insurance companies. 
According to different sources, credit risk represents 75% of banks’ risk exposure, while market risk and 
operational risk account for 5% and 20% respectively. 1 Operational risk is the risk of loss resulting from 
inadequate control processes, people, and systems or from external events. Seven types of events are 
defined by Basel II and Solvency II. One of them is external fraud or unauthorized activities by external 
parties. These activities include theft and fraud. 
One empirical question that has not been investigated in detail is related to the effect of business 
cycles on operational risk. Are the behaviors of the agents involved in operational risk management 
affected by recessions? Do banks and insurance companies spend less money on operational risk control 
when business activities are reduced? Do clients modify their behavior during recessions because their 
wealth or their risk aversion changes? Allen and Bali (2007) found that operational losses are related to 
business cycles. Chernobai et al (2011) obtain a positive dependence between economic downturns and 
the aggregate level of operational risk. To our knowledge, specific loss events have not been analyzed in 
the literature. It is not clear that business cycles affect employment practices and workplace safety, 
business disruption and system failures, and internal or external fraud. Knowledge of the specific factors 
that affect each risk type should be the basic step in strategic management of operational risk by financial 
institutions. 
                                                 
1 We do not know the corresponding numbers for the insurance industry. As we will see later, external fraud 
represents about 5% of claims value in the market we study. External fraud is one of the seven risk types identified in 
operational risk by Solvency II. The six others are: internal fraud; employment practices and workplace safety; 
clients, products and business practices; damage to physical assets; business descriptions and system failures; and 
execution, delivery and process management. 
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Our paper is related to another strand of the literature on the measure of information problems in 
different markets (Chiappori and Salanié, 2012; Dionne, 2012). To our knowledge, only two articles have 
proposed methodologies to separate moral hazard from adverse selection. Dionne and Gagné (2002) 
propose a methodology to separate ex post moral hazard from ex ante moral hazard and adverse selection, 
while Dionne, Michaud and Dahchour (2011) separate asymmetric learning from adverse selection and 
moral hazard. In this article, we extend Dionne and Gagné’s (2002) methodology by showing how 
business cycles can affect economic behavior in the presence of asymmetric information. 
Insurance fraud has become an increasingly important issue throughout the world. Many researchers 
have investigated this problem, but few studies have examined the relationship between fraud and the 
surrounding environment.2 This paper fills this gap and investigates the impact of the environment on 
fraud from a macroeconomic standpoint. It underlines the impact of the business cycle on insurance fraud. 
Dionne (2012) provides many reasons for insurance fraud, such as changes in morality, poverty, 
intermediaries’ behavior, insurers’ attitude or control, and nature of insurance contracts. Although it has 
been pointed out that morality or poverty could affect insurance fraud,3 no studies have provided related 
empirical evidence. However, fraud has been associated with morality, and morality has been linked to a 
country’s poverty level. In addition, the poverty level of society is commonly linked to economic 
circumstances. 
Dionne and Gagné (2002) find a particular pattern of claim timing in Quebec’s automobile insurance 
contracts, and conclude that fraud is induced by the replacement cost endorsement. Dionne and Gagné 
(2001) also show how insurance fraud is affected by the deductible level in insurance contracts. Similarly, 
our contribution posits that insurance fraud is associated to the nature of insurance contract, and further 
                                                 
2 Boyer (2001) is one of the few researchers to discuss the impact of economic factors on insurance fraud, 
specifically that of the tax scheme of the insurance benefit. See also Bates et al. (2010) on health production 
efficiency. 
3 Dionne and Gagné (2002) underline that poverty is a possible reason for fraud. In the theoretical model of Dionne, 
Giuliano, and Picard (2009), the moral cost of fraud is one of the factors that affect individuals’ decision to defraud. 
 3
explores the impact of the business cycle.4 The two insurance contracts we analyze provide additional 
coverage to the standard insurance contracts for automobile theft: replacement cost endorsement which 
covers the depreciation of the vehicle and the non-deductible endorsement which covers the deductible. 
These two endorsements may create distortions in incentives for self-protection and even increase 
insurance fraud. 
It is unclear whether the business cycle has a positive or negative impact on insurance fraud. From 
the insured’s standpoint, people could become more risk-averse in a recession and hesitate to play this 
type of lottery. Conversely, the morality standard could decrease when the economic situation worsens. 
The marginal benefit from fraud could also increase because wealth decreases during a recession, and the 
benefit of defrauding could increase. On the insurer’s side, a recession is a source of lesser economic 
activity and of fewer resources to control the variation of this important operational risk. Hence, 
competing predictions on the relationship between the business cycle and insurance fraud are worth 
testing. 
Insurance fraud is an increasingly important problem in Taiwan. In automobile theft insurance, a 
significant line in the property-liability insurance market,5 fraud accounts for about 5% of total claims. It 
reached 150 million NT dollars in 2008.6 The loss ratio of auto theft insurance is over 35% each year, and 
fraud could be one of the reasons for such a high loss ratio in this important business line. Further, the loss 
ratio fluctuates over time and coincides with the business cycle.7 
                                                 
4 Picard (2012) claims that the severity of insurance fraud ranges from build-up to planned criminal fraud. The 
reason that we focus our study on insurance fraud in theft insurance is because we have selected events that 
correspond to an economic choice and may be related to economic conditions of the insured and the insurer. Either 
the insured has higher fraud incentives for economic reasons or the person’s vehicle can be sold at a profit on the 
black market. This implies that some insured plan some fraudulent theft claims to cheat the insurance company. We 
suspect this behavior, but do not have evidence to prove it. Thus, some events might also be linked to opportunistic 
behavior. We will use the signs or signals of fraud described in the data description section. The insurer’s fraud 
detection activity may also be affected by economic conditions. 
5 From 2000 to 2007, about 26.37% of private sedans were covered by theft insurance. The premium is over 40 
billion NT dollars (about 1.33 billion US dollars) per year, and the growth rate is about 10% per year. 
6 This is roughly equivalent to 5 million US dollars. 
7 If we treat GDP as a proxy variable for the fluctuation of the business cycle, we find that the loss ratio of 
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Taiwan’s automobile theft insurance covers the risk of vehicle loss due to total theft.8 This contract is 
sold annually. Depreciation and deductible are included in this contract.9 In the absence of any 
endorsement, the insurance company is liable for the loss of depreciated value of the insured vehicle less 
10% deductible when the insured vehicle is totally lost due to theft. However, two kinds of endorsement 
can be purchased: the replacement cost endorsement and the no-deductible endorsement. The insurance 
company does not allow the insured to purchase these two kinds of endorsement at the same time. When 
the insured is covered by replacement cost endorsement, depreciation is not calculated when the vehicle is 
stolen. When the insured is covered by no-deductible endorsement, there is no 10% deductible if the 
vehicle is stolen. 
We have collected automobile theft insurance data from Taiwan’s largest property-liability insurance 
company.10 Our monthly data span a long policy period, comprising policies written from 2000 to 2007, 
i.e. a study period of 96 policy months.11 We can thus test the relationship between insurance fraud and 
the business cycle. 
We find a particular pattern of total theft claim timing linked to the replacement cost endorsement. 
The month-by-month test12 indicates that unlike partial theft claims, total theft claims under replacement 
cost endorsement contracts increase over time during the contract year. This finding confirms that 
                                                                                                                                                              
automobile theft insurance is significantly negatively correlated with the level of GDP. We list the automobile theft 
insurance loss ratio of non-commercial vehicles and the GDP of Taiwan in Appendix A, from 1998 to 2009. The 
netative relationship between the loss ratio and GDP is important. The significant correlation coefficient is -0.99. 
8 This contract covers only total theft loss, not partial theft loss. For example, if only video equipment is stolen, the 
insurance company does not indemnify this kind of loss unless the insured had purchased the auto parts and 
accessories endorsement. 
9 The value of the insured vehicle is monthly depreciated. The depreciation rates are: 3%, 5%, 7%, 9%, 11%, 13%, 
15%, 17%, 19%, 21%, 23% and 25% from the first month to the 12th month during the policy year. The deductible is 
sold as a percentage (10%) of the vehicle’s value. 
10 This insurance company controls more than 20% of Taiwan’s automobile insurance market. 
11 For all the contracts written from 2000 to 2007, we collect their complete claim records for the policy year. For 
example, the claim records of policies written in 2007 are extended to the dates in 2008. 
12 In this paper, the periods have been reorganized by policy period. Hence we test policy months instead of calendar 
months. 
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insurance fraud, rather than ex ante moral hazard or adverse selection, arises from the replacement cost 
endorsement. Further, testing by each policy month during the policy year points to another particular 
pattern of claim timing for insurance fraud induced by no-deductible endorsement. The total theft claims 
of no-deductible endorsement are more common during the early months of the contract year. This 
evidence of fraud can also be separated from ex ante moral hazard and adverse selection. These results 
clearly indicate that writing non-optimal contracts in presence of asymmetric information can be very 
costly to insurers. 
Further, the empirical evidence affirms that insurance fraud fluctuates conversely with the business 
cycle. The claim timing patterns for the two types of contracts mentioned above are even more 
pronounced during a recession, which implies that a recession amplifies the incentives for insurance fraud 
induced by contracts. 
Separating ex post moral hazard from ex ante moral hazard and adverse selection is important for 
insurance companies. It allows them to better focus their attention on reducing the cost of insurance fraud 
and, more generally, of a significant part of their operational risk. We have insufficient information to 
determine the main causes of insurance fraud increase during recessions, but insurers can easily verify 
how their operational risk management budget varies with business cycles. Preliminary observations seem 
to indicate that financial institutions reduced significantly their risk management activity for operational 
risk during the last recession and financial crisis because this risk has significantly increased. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section analyses the empirical hypotheses. The second 
section describes the data and the third section discusses the empirical methodology used in this paper. 
The fourth section presents the empirical results. The final section concludes the article. 
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1. Hypotheses 
Insurance fraud incentive is induced by the nature of the insurance contract.13 Two important 
contract types are replacement cost endorsement and no-deductible endorsement. We posit that the degree 
of incentive to defraud is also affected by the business cycle. In this section, four hypotheses are proposed 
for the empirical tests. Before we explore the impact of the business cycle, the claim timing pattern of 
fraud induced by each contract is identified.14 
There are many factors explaining insurance fraud.15 On the demand side, maximizing their expected 
utility, each insured has a critical value of the probability of a fraud being successful. The lower this 
critical value, the greater the insured’s incentive to commit fraud. One can show that this critical value 
decreases when the difference between the vehicle’s replacement cost and the vehicle’s market value 
increases near the expiration of the insurance contract. Accordingly, the insured would consider planning 
fraud near the contract’s expiration with increasing probability. On the supply side, the probability of the 
insurer’s conducting an audit also decreases near the contract’s expiration because the market value of the 
vehicle decreases over time.16 Hence, as Dionne and Gagné’s (2002) theoretical model indicates, 
insurance fraud probability is higher near the expiration of the replacement cost endorsement. 
                                                 
13 Many contributions have discussed the optimal contract design that could reduce the incentive to defraud. Crocker 
and Morgan (1998) theoretically investigate the optimal insurance contract under costly state falsification. Crocker 
and Tennyson (1999) empirically test for the nature of the optimal insurance contract under costly falsification. 
Picard (1996), Bond and Crocker (1997) and Boyer (2004) design the optimal insurance contract under costly state 
verification (see Derrig, 2002, and Picard, 2012, for reviews of the literature). 
14 Identifying the existence of fraud under asymmetric information is an important aim in the literature. For example, 
Artis et al. (2002) adopt a new methodology to identify fraud by allowing the misclassification error in the existing 
method to separate fraudulent claims from honest claims. 
15 Picard (1996) built an equilibrium model between the insurer and the insured to explain the successful fraud 
probability in the market. Dionne and Gagné (2002) extended this model. They found that auditing does not suffice 
to deter fraud. Hence, the success probability of fraud does not correspond to the probability of non-audit. 
16 The stringency of audit could affect the success probability of fraud, but it is not constant over time. Dionne, 
Giuliano and Picard (2009) use red flags as the signals for conducting stringent audit in their optimal auditing 
strategy. Dionne and Gagné (2002) assume that the stringency of audit decreases near the expiration of the 
replacement cost endorsement. 
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We also infer the probability of insurance fraud under such an equilibrium model. On the demand 
side, the individual’s expected utility model is similar to that of Dionne and Gagné (2002). On the supply 
side, we modify their insurer’s audit probability to become flat over time.17 The theoretical model under 
replacement cost endorsement is presented in Appendix B. The main result is consistent with Dionne and 
Gagné (2002) in that the equilibrium fraud probability is higher near the end of the policy year. 
When we study the empirical link between fraud and endorsement contract, this contract is compared 
with the reference contract with both depreciation and deductible. We treat the contract with replacement 
cost endorsement as a high-coverage contract, and the reference contract as a low-coverage contract. A 
contract with replacement cost endorsement reimburses the total value of the car evaluated at the 
beginning of the contract period less the proportional deductible while the reference contract reimburses 
the loss of depreciated value of the vehicle less the proportional deductible. The former contract exhibits 
the claim timing pattern described above, whereas the latter does not. Hence, our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: If the claims are induced by fraud, individuals who choose a replacement cost 
endorsement contract have a higher probability of filing a claim, and this probability is even higher near 
the end of the contract period. 
In addition, we examine incentives to defraud induced by the no-deductible endorsement contract. 
Dionne and Gagné (2001) propose a theoretical model and empirically verify that the design of the 
deductible would increase the incentive to build up a claim. However, this conclusion cannot be applied 
directly to our research design because we investigate fraud related to total theft rather than build-up. We 
assume that people would have a greater incentive to invent fraudulent claims when there is no deductible 
                                                 
17 We make this assumption because insurers in Taiwan do not, in practice, implement a particularly stringent audit 
at the beginning of the contract. First, the market value of a vehicle does not vary as much as in Quebec from the 
beginning to the end of the overall policy period, because the contract length is only for one year, and the 
replacement cost endorsement contract in Taiwan is not designed for new vehicles exclusively. Second, insurance 
companies in Taiwan rely heavily on the mechanism of deductible design in the replacement cost endorsement and a 
more stringent depreciation rate in the no-deductible contract. There is actually no difference in the audit approach 
between the beginning and the end of the policy year as a whole. 
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designed in the contract than with the reference contract. The incentive of fraud is higher under a 
no-deductible endorsement because the insurer reimburses the depreciated value of the car without 
deductible. We derive this result in Appendix C. We also discuss the claim timing pattern for the contract 
with depreciation in Appendix C. Whereas the vehicle depreciation from the insurer’s indemnity is much 
more stringent than that in the market,18 and when the incentive to cheat is large enough, the insured 
would have a stronger incentive to organize fraud at the beginning of the contract period under a contract 
with depreciation and the non-deductible endorsement. Hence, under a flat audit mechanism, the 
equilibrium fraud probability is higher at the beginning of the policy year. 
To identify fraud induced by the no-deductible endorsement contract in our empirical test, we 
compare this contract with the reference contract, which comprises both a deductible and depreciation. 
The contract with depreciation and no-deductible endorsement is thus a high-coverage contract, and the 
reference contract is a low-coverage contract. As shown in Appendix C, the relative claim timing pattern is 
focused on the beginning months of the policy year. Our second hypothesis is therefore: 
Hypothesis 2: If the claims are induced by fraud, individuals who choose the non-deductible 
endorsement contract have a higher probability of filing claims. This probability is even higher at the 
beginning of the contract period. 
Although the main research concern is insurance fraud, the former parts of the above two hypotheses 
could evidently also result from adverse selection. Under adverse selection, high-risk individuals tend to 
purchase the two types of high-coverage contracts and are more likely to make a claim. However, the 
claim would be equally distributed among the twelve months. In contrast, only insurance fraud would 
create a particular pattern in the timing of the claim during the months of the policy year. This 
                                                 
18 In the first three months, the depreciation rates for insurance contract and market value of the car are almost the 
same. However, over time, the market depreciation rate does not increase as fast as that of the insurance contract. In 
the last month of the year, the market depreciation rate is 15%, while the depreciation rate from the insurance 
company is 25%. 
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characteristic enables us to clearly rule out adverse selection. Hence, when the first and second hypotheses 
are empirically sustained, they would provide evidence of insurance fraud rather than adverse selection. 
It is also important to distinguish fraud from ex ante moral hazard.19 Insurance fraud results from an 
individual’s decision to invent a fraudulent claim or not. Ex ante moral hazard arises from the decision to 
pay more or less attention to self-protection. Under the replacement cost endorsement, ex ante moral 
hazard could be stronger near the end of the policy year.20 Conversely, under the no-deductible 
endorsement contract, ex ante moral hazard could be stronger at the beginning of the policy year.21 Ex 
ante moral hazard thus has the same claim timing pattern as insurance fraud. 
Dionne and Gagné (2002) show that fraud can be induced only when the benefit from fraud is 
sufficiently large. They maintain that the benefit from fraud based on partial theft is minor. The incentive 
to defraud through total theft is much stronger than that related to partial theft. This difference in 
incentives provides an opportunity to distinguish fraud from ex ante moral hazard. Self-protection has an 
equal effect in terms of reducing the probability of both total theft and partial theft, but fraud solely leads 
to a stronger incentive to file a total theft claim. Accordingly, fraud could emerge mainly based on the 
probability of a total theft claim instead of a partial theft claim. Hence, our third hypothesis distinguishes 
insurance fraud from ex ante moral hazard. 
Hypothesis 3: If the claim timing patterns in the first and second hypotheses emerge only in relation 
to the total theft claim, insurance fraud exists rather than ex ante moral hazard. If the above patterns also 
                                                 
19 In the literature, the consequences of ex ante moral hazard and fraud are often mixed. For example, when Weiss et 
al. (2010) discussed the distortion effect of regulated insurance pricing, they mention that regulation could cause ex 
ante moral hazard because drivers’ safety investments may be diminished. This regulation could also cause 
fraudulent claims because the disincentive of filing fraudulent claims may also be reduced. 
20 As described in Dionne and Gagné (2002), the benefits of prevention decrease over time under the replacement 
cost endorsement. Hence, the presence of replacement cost endorsement reduces self-protection activities, increasing 
the probability of theft. 
21 The depreciation rate used for the insurer’s indemnity is more stringent than that in the regular market. Hence, the 
difference between the loss indemnity and the vehicle’s market value would be larger near the end of the year. This 
would give the insured a greater incentive to pay more attention to self-protection and to reduce the ex ante moral 
hazard near the end of the year in absence of replacement cost endorsement. Accordingly, under a no-deductible 
contract, there is greater ex ante moral hazard at the beginning of the policy year. 
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emerge relative to the partial theft claim, then ex ante moral hazard may exist in the market, and we 
cannot conclusively determine whether insurance fraud exists. 
Investigating the impact of the business cycle on insurance fraud is the second objective of this 
research. Whether fraud will fluctuate consistently or inversely with the business cycle is unclear. 
Regarding risk aversion, it has been accepted that most people are risk-averse and exhibit decreasing 
absolute risk aversion. In an economic recession, people’s wealth decreases and they become more 
risk-averse. This will make them more hesitant to adopt risky actions, including a fraud lottery. Hence, the 
probability of fraud could decrease during a recession. 
Alternatively, because the individual’s wealth decreases during a recession, the increment of utility 
from the benefit of fraud increases concomitantly, because of a direct wealth effect. Furthermore, if 
recession reduces individuals to the poverty level, they may feel they have much less to lose if they get 
caught committing fraud. This may increase people’s likelihood of defrauding during a recession. 
Fraud is highly related to an individual’s morality. Morality may also vary with wealth level. Husted 
et al. (1999) argue that societal corruption is highly related to GDP per capita. They provide empirical 
evidence that indirectly shows that individuals’ morality level is positively related to their wealth. Dionne, 
Giuliano and Picard (2009) establish in a theoretical model that moral cost affects individuals’ decision to 
defraud. Therefore, from the standpoint of morality, recession reduces the average wealth level. A lower 
wealth level could weaken morality and reduce the moral cost of fraud, which raises the probability of 
fraud. Finally, insurers may reduce their operational risk management during recessions because they have 
fewer resources although they should increase them according to the previous predictions from the insured. 
Because our fourth hypothesis encompasses many conflicting effects that we cannot isolate, we do not 
make a prediction on the sign of the business cycle effect. 
Hypothesis 4: Insurance fraud could be positively or negatively affected by the business cycle. 
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2. Data 
Our data set includes many characteristics of the insured and the insured vehicles, such as the gender, 
age, marital status of the insured; the brand, age, size, registered area, usage purpose of the insured vehicle; 
the information on the contract, such as coverage; the selling channel of the contract; and the claim 
information for each policy. Regarding the claim information, we collect not only the records on the claim 
amount and reason, but also the records on the date of the claim. This could help identify the timing of the 
claim, specifically the policy month during the policy period. 
Further, we use the corresponding calendar date to investigate the impact of the business cycle. Our 
policy data are reorganized by policy year, and the claim timing is described by policy month, whereas the 
business cycle index is recorded by calendar year and calendar month. Accordingly, because we 
investigate the relationship between business cycle and insurance fraud for each policy month, we match 
the calendar date of the claim to the corresponding calendar month in the monthly business cycle index. 
The data examined comprise the policies written from 2000 to 2007 and their corresponding claims 
until the end of 2008. This length of data allows us to match the monthly variation in the macroeconomic 
business cycle index to test the relationship between fraud and business cycle. Hence we use the 
corresponding business cycle index of a potential claim’s calendar month to measure the effect of the 
business cycle. 
The business cycle index is the trend-adjusted monthly index of the composite coincident index from 
January 2000 to December 2008. This index, obtained from the published data of the Council for 
Economic Planning and Development of Taiwan, reflects the fluctuations of the business cycle. The value 
of the index is higher when the economy is healthier, and vice versa. 
The total number of observations in our data set is 1,761,536. When we test whether insurance fraud 
exists under the replacement cost endorsement, we use a sub-sample of replacement cost endorsement 
contracts together with contracts with deductible and depreciation. The number of observations in this 
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sub-sample is 1,715,736. When we test whether fraud exists under no-deductible contracts, we use the 
sub-sample of no-deductible contracts plus contracts with deductible and depreciation. The number of 
observations in this sub-sample is 1,170,012. Because we cannot observe the occurrence of partial theft 
for the contracts without the endorsement of auto parts accessories, we must use a smaller sub-sample of 
contracts with the endorsement of auto parts accessories when we test the relationship between coverage 
and claim timing for the partial theft case. This smaller sub-sample comprises 564,175 observations. 
Observing the basic statistics of the variables in our empirical data can help us understand the data 
characteristics and their representativeness. The variables are defined in Table 1. The descriptive statistics 
for these variables are listed in Table 2. A total of 32.92% of theft insurance policies involve replacement 
cost endorsement, and only about 2.48% of the policies have zero deductible. About 40% of the policies 
are sold through dealer-owned agents. 
(Tables 1 and 2 about here) 
Regarding the nature of the insured individuals, most of the insured (91.23%) are married, between 
30 and 60 years old (87.97%), and female (62.55%). Concerning the insured vehicles, 64.27% of the 
insured vehicles have engine capacities equal to or less than 2000 c.c., and 39.29% of the insured vehicles 
are concentrated in the most popular brand in the market. Concerning vehicle distribution across the 
registered areas, 47.95% are registered in the north of Taiwan, 27.84% in the south, and 2.29% in the east. 
53.51% of the vehicles are registered in cities. 
About 20% of the vehicles are brand new, and more than 70% are less than four years old. A total of 
96.43% of the insured vehicles are non-commercial or long-term rental sedans. These characteristics 
indicate that people are more willing to purchase theft insurance for vehicles for non-commercial use and 
for new vehicles. 
We can make two preliminary comments on insurance, observing some characteristics on 
those who claimed, according to their claim timing. They are presented in Table 3. 
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Consider first the vehicle age. 20.7% of our sample are brand new vehicles.22 In the 
subsample of “stolen vehicle with replacement cost endorsement” contract, 67.28% were stolen 
in the last seven months of the contract, and only 32.72% were stolen in other months. In the 
subsample of stolen vehicle with “no-deductible endorsement” contract, 60.87% were stolen in 
the first three months, and only 39.13% were stolen in the remaining months.23 
(Table 3 about here) 
The second comment concerns the vehicle brand. The percentage of the most popular brand 
(tramak_t) vehicles in our sample is 39.29%.24 In the subsample of “stolen vehicles with 
replacement cost endorsement” contract, 56.32% of these popular brand vehicles were stolen in 
the last seven months, and 43.68% were stolen in other months. In the subsample of stolen 
vehicles with “no deductible endorsement” contract, 63.41% of these popular brand vehicles 
were stolen in first three months, and 36.59% of these popular brand vehicles were stolen in the 
remaining months. It seems that an insured knowing the characteristics of the insurance contract 
may deliberately plan to defraud. The fraud behavior may also be opportunistic, in the sense that 
some market specialists may signal to an insured that it is an opportune time to defraud. Our data 
do not allow us to separate opportunistic fraud from planned fraud. We consequently focus the 
empirical analysis on insurance fraud in general. 
                                                 
22 The percentage of stolen car is 0.29% over the total population. It is 0.57% for brand new vehicles and 0.79% for 
popular brand vehicles, both with the replacement cost endorsement contract. It is 0.49% for brand new vehicles with 
non-deductible endorsement and 0.64% for popular brand vehicles with non-deductible endorsement. 
23 Generally speaking, brand new vehicle value is much higher than that of older vehicles. Hence, the brand new 
vehicle owner has a greater financial incentive to defraud. 
24 This brand is especially often used by taxis. It accounts for over 50% of the vehicle brands of taxis. The vehicles 
of this particular brand can be sold very easily on the black market because there is high demand for auto parts and 
accessories of this brand. 
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3. Empirical methodology 
The first empirical task in this paper is to identify whether insurance fraud exists in the automobile 
theft insurance market in Taiwan. We test the evidence for fraud based on the timing pattern of the 
conditional correlation between coverage and claims. The contract with high coverage is defined as either 
the replacement cost endorsement or the no-deductible contract. The claim is further identified as the total 
theft claim and partial theft claim. 
To test the conditional correlation between coverage and claims, we use a two-stage method similar 
to the methodology for a conditional correlation analysis in Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse (2001). To 
identify the time pattern of the conditional correlation between coverage and claim, we test their 
conditional correlation by policy month. Hence, in each model,25 we conduct the following conditional 
correlation test on twelve pairs from the first policy month to the twelfth policy month. 
The two-stage method is as follows. In the first stage, we estimate the claim probability of the j-th 
policy month for each policy by means of the Probit regression 
 1 1 1Prob( 1 ) ( )jkit it it jkclaim X X    ,  1,...12j  , ,k h p , 1,..i n ,  
2000,...2007t   (1) 
where Prob( )  denotes the probability function,   is the cumulative standard normal distribution 
function, 1, ,i n  , denotes the observations. The observations represent an unbalanced panel from 
policy year 2000 to policy year 2007; k = h is for total claim and k = p is for partial claim. 1itX  is the 
                                                 
25 When we identify the existence of insurance fraud, we test the conditional correlation between claim and coverage 
under four models. In the first model, we test the conditional correlation between total theft claim and coverage of 
contract with replacement cost endorsement. In the second model, we test the conditional correlation between total 
theft claim and coverage of contract with no-deductible endorsement. In the third model, we test the conditional 
correlation between partial theft claim and coverage of contract with replacement cost endorsement. In the fourth 
model, we test the conditional correlation between partial theft claim and coverage of contract with no-deductible 
endorsement. When we identify the relationship between fraud and business cycle, we test under two additional 
models. In the fifth model, we test the effect of the business cycle on the conditional correlation between total theft 
claim and the coverage of contract with replacement cost endorsement. In the sixth model, we test the effect of the 
business cycle on the conditional correlation between total theft claim and the coverage of contract with 
no-deductible endorsement. 
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vector of explanatory variables that includes the characteristics of the insured and the insured vehicle, 
which are listed in Table 1. Some of the explanatory variables, such as sex, age of insured, and age of the 
insured vehicle, are invariant during policy years. Other explanatory variables could vary over policy 
years; these include registered area of vehicle, marriage status, and policy year variable. 1 jk  is the 
corresponding parameter vector, and jkitclaim  is the variable identifying whether the insured claimed or 
not. jkitclaim  is defined by policy month (j), from first policy month to 12
th policy month of the whole 
policy year, for each insured i. 1jkitclaim   when insured i has filed a claim in j -th policy month of 
policy year t, otherwise 0jkitclaim  . 
In the second stage, we run the other Probit regression for the probability of purchasing a 
high-coverage contract as: 
 2
2 2, , , , , ,
ˆProb(cov 1 , , ( ))
ˆ( ( ))
lit it jkit jkit
it l j c l j jkit ec l j jkit
erage X claim Prob claim
X claim Prob claim  

     (2) 
This regression is also based on the standard normal distribution used to estimate the probability of 
purchasing high coverage. The variable litcoverage  is a choice variable of the insured; namely whether 
he or she purchased a high-coverage contract or not in policy year t. There are two definitions of high 
coverage (l) in this paper: ,l R ND , which denotes the replacement cost endorsement, and the 
no-deductible contract, respectively. The reference contracts are the contracts with depreciation and 
deductibles. They are defined as low-coverage. 2itX  is the vector of explanatory variables that contains 
the same variables as in 1itX . jkitclaim  has been defined above, and ˆPr ( )jkitob claim  is the estimated 
probability of jkitclaim . 2, , , , , ,, ,l j c l j ec l j    are the corresponding parameter vectors for the estimation 
under each policy month j, and when we investigate the high-coverage contract as l=R or l=ND. The key 
estimated coefficient used to test the problems of asymmetric information is , ,c l j . There is a significantly 
positive correlation between the l coverage and claim in j-th policy month if the estimated , ,c l j  is 
significantly positive. 
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To disentangle insurance fraud from ex ante moral hazard, we test the conditional correlation between 
coverage and total theft claim, and between coverage and partial theft claim. Hence, the claim in the above 
two regressions is further defined according to total claim (k=h) or partial claim (k=p). When we conduct 
the above test for the conditional correlation between coverage and total theft claim, we can use the 
observations from the full sample. When we conduct the above test for the conditional correlation between 
coverage and partial theft claim, we can use only a sub-sample of insured who have also purchased the 
auto parts accessories endorsement. Because we are estimating total theft claims, we test only for the 
existing effective contracts in each policy month. In other words, the contracts for which total claims have 
been filed are terminated and eliminated from our sample. 
According to the first hypothesis, we test for the total theft claim (k=h) and replacement endorsement 
(l=R). If the estimated , ,c l j , l=R in equation (2) is significantly positive only for some j-th policy months 
near the end of the policy year, it indicates moral hazard instead of pure adverse selection. Insurance fraud 
could be induced by the replacement cost endorsement. According to the second hypothesis, we test for 
the total theft claim (k=h) and no-deductible endorsement (l=ND). If the estimated , ,c l j , l=ND in 
equation (2) is significantly positive only for some j-th policy months occurring early in the policy year, 
this points to moral hazard instead of pure adverse selection. Insurance fraud could thus be induced by the 
no-deductible endorsement. 
When the particular time pattern emerges, we distinguish insurance fraud from ex ante moral hazard. 
According to the third hypothesis, we test the partial theft claim (k=p) for replacement cost endorsement 
(l=R) as well as for no-deductible endorsement (l=ND). If estimated , ,c l j s in equation (2) for all twelve 
policy months ( 1,...12j  ) in the policy year are insignificant, we can infer that the emerging claim timing 
patterns are evidence of fraud instead of ex ante moral hazard. 
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We now have to test the relationship between insurance fraud and the business cycle. We can also test 
this relationship using a two-stage method. We keep the regression in the first stage unchanged. We then 
add the business cycle index to the explanatory variables in the regression of the second stage: 
 2
2 2, , , , , , , ,
ˆProb(cov 1 , , , ( ))
ˆ( ( ))
lit it jkit jkit m jkit
it l j C l j jkit BC l j jkit m ec l j jkit
erage X claim claim Buscyc Prob claim
X claim claim Buscyc Prob claim   
 
       (3) 
mBuscyc  is the monthly business cycle index, which corresponds to each calendar month in each 
year with a potential claim. In our paper, the claim records are ranged among 108 months from January 
2000 to December 2008, and are ranked from “0100” to “1208.”26 We match each of the claim dates in 
our sample to its corresponding calendar date, and find the corresponding month for mBuscyc . The 
variable mBuscyc  is introduced as an interaction term with jkiclaim . The key coefficients used to 
measure the relationship between fraud and the business cycle for contract l  are , ,BC l j s during some 
j-th policy months. According to our fourth hypothesis, the fraud rate could rise or decline with the 
recession according to either of the two conflicting effects. If fraud is more severe in a recession, for high 
coverage contracts representing contracts with replacement cost endorsement, the , ,BC l j s (l=R) in 
equation (3) should be significantly negative only for those j-th policy months near the end of the whole 
policy year; for high coverage contracts representing the no-deductible contract, the , ,BC l j s (l=ND) in 
equation (3) should be significantly negative only for those j-th policy months at some beginning months 
of the policy year. This indicates that insurance fraud is more severe while the economy is in a recession. 
Conversely, if the estimated , ,BC l j s are significantly positive in the above-mentioned policy months, this 
affirms that insurance fraud is more severe while the economy is booming. Finally, if all the estimated 
, ,BC l j s are insignificant, the business cycle has no impact on insurance fraud. 
                                                 
26 The first two codes of m represent the calendar month, and the second two codes of m represent the calendar year. 
For example, m=0100 is for the business cycle index of January 2000. 
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4. Empirical results 
The first empirical task is to identify whether fraud exists in the automobile theft insurance market in 
Taiwan. We try to disentangle ex post moral hazard from adverse selection and ex ante moral hazard. 
Table 4 shows that for total theft claims, the estimated , ,c l j s (l=R) are significantly positive only after 
the sixth policy month of the contract in the subsample of replacement cost endorsement contracts versus 
the reference contracts; the estimated , ,c l j s (l=ND) are significantly positive only before the third policy 
month of the contract in the subsample of no-deductible endorsement contracts versus the reference 
contracts.27 The conditional correlations between coverage and claims exhibit significant time patterns 
under both contracts for total theft claims. The former finding is consistent with that of Dionne and Gagné 
(2002), and supports our first hypothesis. The second finding sustains the particular condition in our 
second hypothesis and its inference. Hence, these outcomes provide evidence only for the possible 
existence of insurance fraud rather than adverse selection. 
In the case of partial theft claims, all of the estimated , ,c l j s are not significant in both subsamples, 
meaning that the conditional correlations between coverage and partial theft claims are all insignificant. 
These outcomes preclude the existence of ex ante moral hazard and confirm the evidence of fraud. 
Therefore, our third hypothesis is supported. All the outcomes, which support the first to third hypotheses, 
confirm that fraud is induced by the two contract characteristics: replacement cost endorsement and 
no-deductible endorsement. 
(Table 4 about here) 
                                                 
27 There are 48 pairs of regressions when we test the conditional correlation between two dimensions of claims (total 
theft claim as well as partial theft claim) and two dimensions of coverage (the coverage of contracts with 
replacement cost endorsement and the coverage of contracts with no-deductible endorsement). It is redundant to 
report complete results for all 48 pairs of regressions. Hence, we display only 48 key estimated coefficients ( , ,c l j ) 
from the second-stage regression in Table 4, and report two examples of ensuing regression results in Appendix D. 
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Regarding the test associated with the business cycle, the empirical results of the estimated 
coefficients of , ,C l j  and , ,BC l j  in the second stage are listed in Table 5.28 Because the test here is to 
identify the impact of the business cycle on insurance fraud, we need only test this relationship for total 
theft claims.  
Table 5 demonstrates that under replacement cost endorsement, all of the estimated , ,BC l j s (l=R) are 
negative and are significant only after the 10th policy month. The estimated , ,C l j s retained their time 
pattern: they are significantly positive only for policy months near the end of the first policy year. Under a 
no-deductible contract (l=ND), all the estimated , ,BC l j s are still negative; they are significant only in the 
first two policy months. These outcomes mean that the conditional correlation between coverage and 
claim is stronger when economic conditions are deteriorating. The claim timing patterns for these types of 
contracts are reinforced by the business cycle. Such empirical evidence indicates that insurance fraud 
increases during a recession. The business cycle accentuates the timing pattern of the two contracts. 
(Table 5 about here) 
5. Conclusion 
The main goal of this paper was to investigate the impact of the business cycle on insurance fraud. 
Few studies have associated the fraud problem with the surroundings, and none have discussed the impact 
of the business cycle on the severity of fraud. We find that insurance fraud is more severe during a 
recession. 
We also test whether insurance fraud could be induced by different kinds of insurance contracts. We 
confirm that there are particular time patterns for total theft claims induced by replacement cost 
endorsement and no-deductible endorsement. We separate this evidence from adverse selection. We also 
                                                 
28 There are 24 pairs of regressions when we test the relationship between business cycle and fraud. For similar 
reasons as before, it is redundant to report complete results for all 24 pairs of regressions. Hence, we display only the 
key estimated coefficients ( , ,C l j  and , ,BC l j ) from the second-stage regression in Table 5, and report two 
examples of these coefficients in Appendix E. 
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find that these particular claim timing patterns exist only in total theft claims, as opposed to partial theft 
claims. This additional evidence serves to differentiate insurance fraud from ex ante moral hazard. These 
conclusions corroborate the finding of Dionne and Gagné (2002). 
Insurers can influence operational risk. They can use risk control and risk financing. For large 
unexpected losses such as business disruptions and computer system failures risk financing by holding 
capital is important and complements risk control. For small losses as consumer insurance fraud, risk 
control is usually sufficient. Our research has shown that business cycles affect external fraud or insurance 
fraud from the clients. We verified that insurance fraud increases in low economic activity or recession. 
We cannot separate the different causes of this result: it may be explained by a change in consumer 
behavior or by a change in insurer control (or both). Future research should design a methodology to 
disentangle the different causes in order to improve the risk management of this type of operational risk. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: The relationship between Taiwan’s auto theft insurance loss ratio of non-commercial 
vehicles and GDP 29 
Year Loss ratio GDP 
1998 66.93 9,204,174 
1999 62.67 9,649,049 
2000 54.38 10,187,394 
2001 56.64 9,930,387 
2002 54.81 10,411,639 
2003 49.55 10,696,257 
2004 47.83 11,365,292 
2005 45.87 11,740,279 
2006 39.47 12,243,471 
2007 35.72 12,910,511 
2008 36 12,698,501 
2009 36.83 12,512,678 
Notes: The yearly loss ratio data come from the Taiwan Insurance Institute. The yearly GDP data come 
from the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, R.O.C. The 
unit of GDP is one million NT dollars. We estimated the correlation coefficient between the loss 
ratio and GDP for these twelve years. The correlation coefficient is -0.99, and is significantly 
different from 0 at the 1% significance level.
                                                 
29 Over the past decade, many prevention measures adopted by police authorities and by vehicle owners have 
generated an effective reduction in automobile burglary. Such measures include: setting a monitor at the burglary hot 
spots, and increasing the frequency of patrol. Further, more consciousness of self-protection and more developed 
burglarproof technology also helps decrease the burglary rate. Meanwhile, the premium of automobile theft 
insurance was not adjusted as rapidly as the burglary rate. This could be the reason why there is almost a 50% drop 
in the loss ratio over the past decade. However, this drop in loss ratios may not come from a drop in fraud. We do not 
claim that the GDP is the driving force behind insurance fraud. We simply note the loss ratio negatively fluctuates 
with GDP. 
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Appendix B: Insurance fraud under replacement cost endorsement 
Assume that the consumer is risk averse. The expected utility of an insured is equal to 
),()1(),
)(
(  WUgDA
th
AWgU  . 
where U  is the utility function for the risk averse individual, W  is the individual’s wealth, not 
including the value of the vehicle, A is the market value of the vehicle at the beginning of the 
policy year, )(th  is the depreciation rate for the market value of the vehicle, which is an 
increasing function of time t , and t  denotes the month of the policy year.   is the discount rate 
when the fraudulent individual starts his fraud activity, 10   . g is the probability of the 
fraud being successful. D  is the deductible designed in the contract. The model assumes that 
the market value of the vehicle will be totally expropriated if the individual’s fraudulent behavior 
is discovered by the insurance company. This causes the wealth level of the fraudulent individual 
who is caught to be limited to W .   is the moral cost of fraud. As in Dionne et al (2009), we 
assume that 0 U . We also assume that 0
2  WU . The individual will defraud if 
)0,
)(
(),()1(),
)(
(
th
AWUWUgDA
th
AWgU    
In the absence of moral cost of fraud ( 0 ), there is a critical successful fraud probability 
g~  at which there is indifference between being honest and dishonest: 
)0,
)(
()0,()~1()0,
)(
(~
th
AWUWUgDA
th
AWUg   
1~0  g . When the successful fraud probability gp ~ , the individual would defraud. 
Furthermore, this critical value of the probability of the fraud being successful is: 
)0,()0,(
)0,()0,(~
)(
)(
WUDAWU
WUWU
g
th
A
th
A

  . 
The expected utility function of an individual who has a probability ( ) of engaging in 
fraudulent behavior can therefore be written as:  
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(~[
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AWUWUgDA
th
AWUgEU    
The individual has a probability equal to 1 of engaging in fraud when the probability of the fraud 
being successful is above g~ . On the contrary, the individual has a probability equal to 0 of 
engaging in fraud when the probability of the fraud being successful is below g~ . In addition, 
there is a probability of fraud of between 1 and 0 when the probability of the fraud being 
successful is equal to g~ . Consequently, the probability of an individual engaging in fraud 
decreases with g~ . Intuitively, g~  should be very low to defraud, which means that when there 
is no moral cost for an individual, the threshold for the individual to defraud is very low. 
When there is no moral cost for the individual, as time increases: 
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We rewrite ( den ) as the denominator of the above equation and obtain: 
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

 
Because the incentive for an individual to engage in fraud is higher when )()( thAthA DA  , 
the first set of square brackets is smaller than the second set in the above equation, and the first 
derivative of the utility under DAW thA  )(  is also smaller than the corresponding 
derivative under )(thAW  . In addition,   is between 0 and 1. All of these factors make the value 
inside the braces negative. Moreover, 0)(  th , hence, the sign of the above equation (
dt
gd~ ) is 
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negative. 
The above analysis infers that g~  will decrease with t , and that the probability   will 
increase with t . Hence, the probability ( ) of an individual engaging in fraud is higher near the 
end of the policy year. If the audit probability of the insurance company is flat over the whole 
policy year, the equilibrium rate of fraud could also be higher near the end of the policy year.  
    When there is a moral cost ( 0 ), there is also a critical successful fraud probability g  at 
which there is indifference between being honest and dishonest: 
)0,
)(
(),()1(),
)(
(
th
AWUWUgDA
th
AWUg     
We can derive the critical value of the probability of the fraud being successful )(g  g . For 
each   level, there is a corresponding )(g . When the successful fraud probability is gp  , 
the individual would defraud. We can verify that 1~ 0  gg  . When the successful fraud 
probability is  p g , the individual would defraud, where g  solves: 
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    As time increases: 
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We also find that 0
dt
gd , which means that the critical successful fraud probability would 
decrease over time. We can also analyze the effect of moral cost on .
dg
dt
 We do not present this 
relationship here because we do not have data to test its sign. The theoretical result is available 
from the authors.
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Appendix C: Insurance fraud under the no-deductible contract 
First, we examine whether the incentive of insurance fraud is higher under a no-deductible 
endorsement. We still assume the individual is risk-averse, 
( , ) (1 ) ( , )
( ) ( )
A AgU W D g U W
h t k t
       . 
The individual’s insurance contract is indemnified with depreciation. The depreciation rate 
( ( )k t ) increases with time t . Furthermore, the depreciation rate from the indemnity of the 
insurance company ( ( )k t ) is more stringent than that in the market ( ( )h t ), i.e., ( ) ( )k t h t  and 
2 2
1 1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
k t h t
k t h t  t . The definitions of g , W ,  , A , and   are the same as those in the 
model in Appendix B. The totally expropriated constraint is also the same as in Appendix B. 
There exists a critical value of the probability ( g ) of the fraud being successful at which 
there is indifference between being honest and dishonest: 
( , ) (1 ) ( , ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
A A AgU W D g U W U W
h t k t h t
          . 
The expected utility function of an individual who has the probability ( ) of engaging in 
fraud is therefore expressed as follows:  
[ ( , ) (1 ) ( , )] (1 ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
A A AEU gU W g U W U W
h t k t h t
             . 
The individual has a probability of 1 of engaging in fraud when the probability of the fraud being 
successful is above g . Conversely, the individual has a probability of 0 of engaging in fraud 
when the probability of the fraud being successful is below g . Finally, the individual has a 
probability of fraud of between 1 and 0 when the probability of the fraud being successful equals 
g . To summarize, the probability of the individual’s engaging in fraud decreases with g . 
Furthermore, this critical value of the probability of the fraud being successful is: 
1
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where D
tk
A
th
AWW 
)()(1
 , 
)(2 th
AWW  , WW 3 ; g  is the relative utility of no 
cheating. It is the utility difference between no cheating and being caught cheating, compared 
with the utility difference between cheating and being caught cheating. 
As the deductible increases: 
)]1)(,(1[
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2 
 WU
dD
gd , 
we find that g~  is affected by the comparative utility of no cheating (
1
2

 ), and the relative 
marginal effect of deductible ( ),(1 1
1
WU  ). The above derivative is positive, which means that 
when the deductible increases, the critical value of the probability of successful fraud also 
increases, and the incentive to defraud decreases. Hence, people who purchase no-deductible 
contracts have a stronger incentive to defraud. 
We now discuss the relative claim timing pattern for the contract with depreciation and 
no-deductible endorsement in contrast to the reference contract. We consider the impact of timing 
on the incentive induced by the no-deductible endorsement. In other words, we consider the 
impact of t  on 
dD
gd~ . Let 
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The first term in the above equation means that the relative utility of no cheating is varying with 
time. Regardless of whether cheating occurs, the utility will decrease because of depreciation. If 
the difference in wealth level between no deductible and deductible contracts is sufficient, this 
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first term will be negative. This means that over time, the utility of the no deductible contract will 
decrease more under no cheating, but it will decrease less under cheating. The incentive of fraud 
induced by no-deductible contracts would decrease over time. 
The second term means that the marginal utility affected by the deductible is varying over 
time. It is positive, and it contrasts with the first term whereby the fraud incentive from a 
no-deductible contract increases over time, because the marginal utility of wealth is higher when 
the wealth level depreciates over time. However, if the difference in wealth level between no 
deductible and deductible contract is sufficient, the whole equation would still be negative. This 
means that the critical value of probability of successfully defraud induced by no deductible 
contract is mitigated over time. This corresponds to the second part of our second hypothesis, 
which states that the probability of fraud (for no-deductible endorsement contracts) is higher at 
the beginning of the policy year. We can also explore the theoretical relationship between moral 
cost of fraud and dH
dt
. Results are available from the authors. 
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Appendix D: Complete empirical results of the 12th policy month and the 1st policy month of 
Equations (1) and (2) 
 
Variable 
12th policy month 1st policy month 
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
 Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
intercept -17.253 0.890 -0.481 <.0001 -18.772 0.845 -0.561 <.0001 
E (total theft)   0.121 0.063   1.972 0.001 
total theft   1.703 <.0001   0.894 0.022 
female -0.065 0.087 0.129 <.0001 -0.138 <.0001 0.226 0.008 
married 0.067 0.290 -0.288 <.0001 -0.037 0.547 0.087 0.001 
age 20-25 4.402 0.001 -0.812 0.036 3.379 0.995 -7.157 0.001 
age 26-30 4.241 0.003 -0.398 0.293 3.085 0.995 -6.724 <.0001 
age 31-60 3.957 0.007 -0.193 0.596 2.852 0.996 -6.411 <.0001 
age 61-70 3.978 0.007 -0.228 0.534 2.883 0.996 -6.472 <.0001 
age above 70 -0.997 0.999 0.312 0.252 2.809 0.996 -6.231 <.0001 
car age 0 0.673 0.011 0.164 <.0001 0.285 <.0001 -0.768 <.0001 
car age 1 0.377 0.002 0.339 <.0001 0.257 <.0001 -0.340 0.032 
car age 2 0.233 0.004 0.340 <.0001 0.256 <.0001 -0.454 0.004 
car age 3 -0.032 0.771 0.265 <.0001 0.200 0.006 -0.361 0.004 
car age 4 0.171 0.070 0.160 <.0001 0.157 0.045 -0.300 0.002 
city 0.100 0.009 -0.303 <.0001 0.083 0.041 -0.169 0.001 
north -0.143 0.003 0.931 <.0001 -0.295 0.000 0.565 0.002 
south 0.045 0.340 -1.298 <.0001 -0.089 0.055 0.162 0.004 
east -0.327 0.093 -1.283 <.0001 -0.060 0.591 0.345 <.0001 
Nissan -0.021 0.943 0.776 <.0001 -5.230 0.988 10.338 0.001 
Ford -0.058 0.386 -0.468 <.0001 -0.094 0.178 0.086 0.149 
Honda 0.176 0.003 -0.172 <.0001 0.204 <.0001 -0.469 <.0001 
Toyota -0.081 0.073 1.205 <.0001 -0.056 0.254 -0.094 0.008 
Mitsubishi 0.180 0.006 -0.209 <.0001 0.079 0.228 -0.200 0.021 
sedan 0.356 0.014 0.798 <.0001 0.022 0.820 -0.617 0.003 
freight truck 0.457 0.023 -0.548 0.003 0.307 0.023 -0.334 0.019 
2000 cc engine -0.031 0.879 -0.237 0.147 -0.028 0.879 -0.512 0.008 
car dealer agent -0.002 0.913 -0.688 0.006 -0.007 0.801 -0.341 0.011 
rental company -0.082 0.213 0.439 0.012 -0.069 0.277 0.397 0.010 
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transport service 0.019 0.233 -0.511 0.006 0.013 0.201 -0.486 <.0001 
finance house -0.071 0.308 -0.398 0.017 -0.054 0.429 -0.217 0.020 
financial institution 0.009 0.879 -0.487 0.021 0.011 0.711 -0.610 0.005 
insurance agent -0.121 0.137 -0.508 0.010 -0.175 0.168 -0.113 0.042 
y 2000 0.217 0.781 -1.021 <.0001 0.303 0.500 0.998 <.0001 
y 2001 0.268 0.645 1.130 <.0001 0.191 0.712 0.716 <.0001 
y 2002 0.277 0.598 -1.044 <.0001 0.301 0.511 0.823 <.0001 
y 2003 0.262 0.523 -1.211 <.0001 0.198 0.698 0.645 <.0001 
y 2004 0.227 0.618 1.037 <.0001 0.288 0.516 0.811 <.0001 
y 2005 0.213 0.790 -1.002 <.0001 0.192 0.689 0.930 <.0001 
y 2006 0.298 0.433 -0.581 <.0001 0.411 0.322 0.752 <.0001 
     
Hausman test 2.83 1.97 2.07 1.33 
Notes: 
In model (1), we estimate the conditional correlation between total theft claim and the contract coverage 
replacement cost endorsement. 
In model (2), we estimate the conditional correlation between total theft claim and the contract coverage 
no-deductible endorsement. 
We applied the Hausman test and did not reject the random effect model. The computed chi-square 
statistics are reported in the table. 
This table presents the explanatory variables used as controls in the regressions of our analysis. A 12th 
policy month regression is linked more closely to the replacement cost endorsement clause, while the 1st 
policy month is linked more closely to the non-deductible endorsement. In each regression, the first 
dependent variable is the probability of having a vehicle stolen (1st stage) and the second variable is the 
probability of choosing an endorsement (2nd stage). The predicted variable of the first stage (E (total 
theft)) is used as explanatory variable in the second stage to control for non-linearity and 
misspecification. Total theft claim dummy variable (total theft) is the explanatory variable used to 
measure the conditional correlation. The other variables presented in Table 1 control for sex (female), 
marriage (married), insured age (age x), the age of the car (car age y), city or not (city), region (north, 
south, east), type of car (Nissan, Ford, Honda, Toyota, Mitsubishi), use of vehicle (sedan or freight 
truck), sales channel (car dealer agent, rental company, transport service, finance house, financial 
institution, insurance agent), and year of the insurance polity (year t). Estimate is the estimated 
coefficient and P-value is for statistical significance.
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Appendix E: Complete empirical results of the 12th policy month and the 1st policy month 
of Equation (3) 
 
Variable 
12th policy month 1st policy month 
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
 Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
intercept -17.253 0.890 -0.875 <.0001 -18.772 0.845 -0.766 <.0001 
E (total theft)   2.836 0.524   5.448 0.481 
total theft   15.000 0.025   9.276 0.018 
interaction   -0.148 0.038   -0.093 0.016 
female -0.065 0.087 0.011 <.0001 -0.138 <.0001 -0.861 0.421 
married 0.067 0.290 -0.537 <.0001 -0.037 0.547 -0.190 0.536 
age 20-25 4.402 0.001 -12.562 0.145 3.379 0.995 22.629 0.362 
age 26-30 4.241 0.003 -11.727 0.907 3.085 0.995 21.096 0.436 
age 31-60 3.957 0.007 -10.872 0.644 2.852 0.996 19.963 0.489 
age 61-70 3.978 0.007 -10.929 0.670 2.883 0.996 20.050 0.484 
age above 70 -0.997 0.999 2.345 0.921 2.809 0.996 20.099 0.491 
car age 0 0.673 0.011 -1.394 <.0001 0.285 <.0001 1.296 0.550 
car age 1 0.377 0.002 -0.907 <.0001 0.257 <.0001 1.101 0.573 
car age 2 0.233 0.004 -0.720 <.0001 0.256 <.0001 1.133 0.562 
car age 3 -0.032 0.771 0.007 <.0001 0.200 0.006 1.028 0.505 
car age 4 0.171 0.070 -0.609 <.0001 0.157 0.045 0.494 0.677 
city 0.100 0.009 -0.425 <.0001 0.083 0.041 0.415 0.517 
north -0.143 0.003 1.472 <.0001 -0.295 0.000 -1.507 0.508 
south 0.045 0.340 -0.594 <.0001 -0.089 0.055 -0.554 0.430 
east -0.327 0.093 -0.011 <.0001 -0.060 0.591 -0.389 0.458 
Nissan -0.021 0.943 0.868 <.0001 -5.230 0.988 -34.947 0.997 
Ford -0.058 0.386 -0.038 <.0001 -0.094 0.178 -0.477 0.521 
Honda 0.176 0.003 -1.222 <.0001 0.204 <.0001 1.230 0.440 
Toyota -0.081 0.073 0.940 <.0001 -0.056 0.254 -0.445 0.332 
Mitsubishi 0.180 0.006 -0.491 0.017 0.079 0.228 0.387 0.502 
sedan 0.356 0.014 0.836 <.0001 0.022 0.820 -0.745 0.002 
freight truck 0.457 0.023 -0.620 <.0001 0.307 0.023 -0.869 <.0001 
2000 cc engine -0.031 0.879 -0.125 <.0001 -0.028 0.879 -0.238 <.0001 
car dealer agent -0.002 0.913 -0.701 0.001 -0.007 0.801 -0.544 0.002 
rental company -0.082 0.213 0.537 0.007 -0.069 0.277 0.312 0.011 
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transport service 0.019 0.233 -0.562 0.007 0.013 0.201 -0.076 0.065 
finance house -0.071 0.308 -0.427 0.010 -0.054 0.429 -0.297 0.114 
financial institution 0.009 0.879 -0.672 0.006 0.011 0.711 -0.581 0.003 
insurance agent -0.121 0.137 -0.629 0.005 -0.175 0.168 -0.267 0.218 
y 2000 0.217 0.781 -1.345 <.0001 0.303 0.500 0.839 <.0001 
y 2001 0.268 0.645 1.394 <.0001 0.191 0.712 0.764 <.0001 
y 2002 0.277 0.598 -1.907 <.0001 0.301 0.511 1.011 <.0001 
y 2003 0.262 0.523 -1.720 <.0001 0.198 0.698 0.876 <.0001 
y 2004 0.227 0.618 1.007 <.0001 0.288 0.516 0.882 <.0001 
y 2005 0.213 0.790 -1.609 <.0001 0.192 0.689 0.988 <.0001 
y 2006 0.298 0.433 -0.425 <.0001 0.411 0.322 1.032 <.0001 
     
Hausman test 2.83 2.05 2.07 1.98 
Notes: 
In model (1’), we estimate the conditional correlation between total theft claim and the contract coverage 
replacement cost endorsement. 
In model (2’), we estimate the conditional correlation between total theft claim and the contract coverage 
no-deductible endorsement. 
We applied the Hausman test and did not reject the random effect model. The computed chi-square 
statistics are reported in the table. 
This table presents the explanatory variables used as controls in the regressions of our analysis. A 12th 
policy month regression is linked more closely to the replacement cost endorsement clause, while the 1st 
policy month is linked more closely to the non-deductible endorsement. In each regression, the first 
dependent variable is the probability of having a vehicle stolen (1st stage) and the second variable is the 
probability of choosing an endorsement (2nd stage). The predicted variable of the first stage (E (total 
theft)) is used as explanatory variables in the second stage to control for non-linearity and 
misspecification. The total theft claim dummy variable (total theft) is the explanatory variable used to 
measure the conditional correlation. Interaction is the interaction between total theft and business cycle. 
The other variables discussed in Table 1 control for sex (female), marriage (married), insured age (age x), 
the age of the car (car age y), city or not (city), region (north, south, east), type of car (Nissan, Ford, 
Honda, Toyota, Mitsubishi), use of vehicle (sedan or freight truck), sales channel (car dealer agent, 
rental company, transport service, finance house, financial institution, insurance agent), and year of the 
insurance polity (year t). Estimate is the estimated coefficient and P-value is for statistical significance. 
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Table 1  Definitions of variables 
Variable Definition  
claim jkit A variable that equals 1 when policy-holder_i has filed a k-type theft claim 
in the j-th month during the policy year t, j=1 to 12, k=h or p, (h means 
total theft, and p means partial theft), and 0 otherwise. 
replacement cost A variable that equals 1 when the theft insurance contract has a 
replacement cost endorsement, and 0 otherwise (depreciation). 
non-deductible A variable that equals 1 when the theft insurance contract is a 
no-deductible contract, and 0 otherwise (deductible). 
female A variable that equals 1 if the insured is female, and 0 otherwise (male). 
married A variable that equals 1 if the insured is married, and 0 otherwise (not 
married). 
age 20-25 A variable that equals 1 if the insured is between the ages of 20 and 25, 
and 0 otherwise. 
age 26-30 A variable that equals 1 if the insured is between the ages of 25 and 30, 
and 0 otherwise. 
age 31-60 A variable that equals 1 if the insured is between the ages of 30 and 60, 
and 0 otherwise. 
age 61-70 A variable that equals 1 if the insured is between the ages of 60 and 70, 
and 0 otherwise. 
age above 70 A variable that equals 1 if the insured is over 70 years old, and 0 
otherwise. 
car age 0 A variable that equals 1 when the car is under one year old, and 0 
otherwise. 
car age 1 A variable that equals 1 when the car is one year old, and 0 otherwise. 
car age 2 A variable that equals 1 when the car is two years old, and 0 otherwise. 
car age 3 A variable that equals 1 when the car is three years old, and 0 otherwise. 
car age 4 A variable that equals 1 when the car is four years old, and 0 otherwise. 
city A variable that equals 1 when the owner of the car lives in a city, and 0 
otherwise. 
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north A variable that equals 1 when the car is registered in the north of Taiwan, 
and 0 otherwise. 
south A variable that equals 1 when the car is registered in the south of Taiwan, 
and 0 otherwise. 
east A variable that equals 1 when the car is registered in the east of Taiwan, 
and 0 otherwise. 
brand vehicle A variable that equals 1 when the vehicle is brand q, q=n, f, h, t, c, and 0 
otherwise (other brands). 
sedan A variable that equals 1 when the car is a sedan and is for non-commercial 
or for long-term rental purposes, and 0 otherwise (all other usages). 
freight truck A variable that equals 1 when the vehicle is a small freight truck used for 
non-commercial purposes, and 0 otherwise (all other usages) 
2000 cc engine A variable that equals 1 when the insured car has an engine capacity of 
2000 c.c. or less, and 0 otherwise (above 2000 c.c.). 
distribution channel m A variable that equals 1 when the policy is sold through the m channel, 
m=D, R, T, L, F, A, and 0 otherwise (directly from insurance company). 
year t A variable that equals 1 when the data belong to the policy year t=2000 to 
2006, and 0 otherwise (2007). 
Notes: 
The reference group of variables age is the group of insured whose age is under 20. 
The reference group of variables from car age is the group of cars over four years old. 
The reference group for the three variables of area includes the cars registered in central Taiwan. 
The reference group for the policy year variables is the group of data from the policy year 2007. 
Brand vehicle: n = Nissan; f = Ford; h = Honda; t = Toyota; c = Mitsubishi. 
Chanel: D = car dealer agent; R = rental company; T = transport service company; L = finance house, 
F = financial institution, A = insurance agent. 
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Table 2  Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
replacement cost 0.3358 0.4699 
non-deductible 0.0260 0.1554 
female 0.6255 0.4840 
married 0.9123 0.2828 
age 20-25 0.0091 0.0949 
age 26-30 0.0639 0.2446 
age 31-60 0.8797 0.3253 
age 61-70 0.0410 0.1986 
age above 70 0.0066 0.0773 
car age 0 0.2070 0.3942 
car age 1 0.1545 0.3694 
car age 2 0.1371 0.3462 
car age 3 0.1190 0.3213 
car age 4 0.1014 0.2978 
city 0.5351 0.4988 
north 0.4795 0.4996 
south 0.2784 0.4482 
east 0.0229 0.1496 
Nissan 0.0062 0.0743 
Ford 0.1049 0.3064 
Honda 0.0788 0.2585 
Toyota 0.3929 0.4884 
Mitsubishi 0.0823 0.2773 
sedan 0.9643 0.1817 
freight truck 0.0183 0.1237 
2000 cc engine 0.6427 0.4792 
car dealer agent 0.4177 0.4971 
rental company 0.0004 0.0201 
transport service 0.0040 0.0594 
finance house 0.0330 0.1417 
financial institution 0.0145 0.1224 
insurance agent 0.0278 0.1726 
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Table 3  Relationship between age and type of vehicle with respect to period of the year 
        they are stolen 
 In whole 
sample   
Subsample of stolen vehicles 
with replacement cost 
endorsement contract 
Subsample of stolen vehicles 
with no-deductible 
endorsement contract 
Last 7 months Other months First 3 months Other months 
Brand new 
vehicles 
20.7% 67.28% 32.72% 60.87% 39.13% 
Popular brand 
vehicles 
39.29% 56.32% 43.68% 63.41% 36.59% 
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Table 4  Conditional correlation between coverage and claim 
Policy 
month 
Total theft claim (k=h) Partial theft claim (k=p) 
Model (1) 
Replacement 
(l=R) 
Model (2) 
No-deductible 
(l=ND) 
Model (3) 
Replacement 
(l=R) 
Model (4) 
No-deductible 
(l=ND) 
1st policy month 
(j=1) 
0.287 
(0.221) 
0.894 
(0.022) 
0.213 
(0.211) 
0.097 
(0.623) 
2nd policy month 
(j=2) 
0.301 
(0.192) 
0.507 
(0.040) 
0.165 
(0.332) 
0.209 
(0.301) 
3rd policy month 
(j=3) 
0.141 
(0.541) 
0.389 
(0.079) 
0.194 
(0.272) 
0.174 
(0.283) 
4th policy month 
(j=4) 
0.230 
(0.188) 
0.198 
(0.299) 
0.091 
(0.609) 
0.097 
(0.531) 
5th policy month 
(j=5) 
0.092 
(0.681) 
0.168 
(0.395) 
0.062 
(0.478) 
0.109 
(0.238) 
6th policy month 
(j=6) 
0.523 
(0.023) 
0.114 
(0.422) 
0.097 
(0.581) 
0.074 
(0.652) 
7th policy month 
(j=7) 
0.965 
(<0.0001) 
0.138 
(0.321) 
0.100 
(0.270) 
0.039 
(0.884) 
8th policy month 
(j=8) 
0.683 
(0.002) 
0.045 
(0.761) 
0.081 
(0.613) 
0.052 
(0.688) 
9th policy month 
(j=9) 
0.731 
(0.003) 
0.039 
(0.812) 
0.122 
(0.297) 
0.189 
(0.258) 
10th policy month 
(j=10) 
0.552 
(0.019) 
0.005 
(0.974) 
0.013 
(0.899) 
0.047 
(0.768) 
11th policy month 
(j=11) 
1.356 
(<0.0001) 
0.094 
(0.592) 
0.057 
(0.682) 
0.005 
(0.923) 
12th policy month 
(j=12) 
1.703 
(<0.0001) 
0.211 
(0.228) 
0.079 
(0.672) 
0.075 
(0.691) 
Notes:  The P-values are in parentheses. All the values displayed in the above table are the estimated 
coefficients of , ,c l j . We test the conditional correlation between coverage and claim by , ,c l j . 
For each policy month (j, j=1~12), we estimate the conditional correlation between claim (k, k=h 
represents total theft claim; k=p represents partial theft claim) and contract coverage (l, l=R 
represents replacement cost endorsement; l=ND represents no-deductible contract) using the 
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two-stage method. In model (1), we estimate the conditional correlation between total theft 
claims and the coverage of contracts with replacement cost endorsement. In model (2), we 
estimate the conditional correlation between total theft claims and the coverage of contracts with 
no-deductible endorsement. In model (3), we estimate the conditional correlation between partial 
theft claims and the coverage of contracts with replacement cost endorsement. In model (4), we 
estimate the conditional correlation between partial theft claims and the coverage of contracts 
with no-deductible endorsement. 
When we conducted a two-stage conditional correlation analysis on the above 48 pairs, we 
applied the Hausman test to each of the 96 regressions. In all cases, the results do not reject the 
random effect model. 
 40
Table 5  Relationship between insurance fraud and the business cycle 
Policy 
month 
Model (1’) 
replacement (l=R) 
Model (2’) 
no-deductible (l=ND) 
Coefficient , ,C l j  Coefficient , ,BC l j  Coefficient , ,C l j  Coefficient , ,BC l j  
1st policy month 
(j=1) 
0.203 
(0.962) 
-0.003 
(0.946) 
9.276 
(0.018) 
-0.093 
(0.016) 
2nd policy month 
(j=2) 
2.073 
(0.656) 
-0.018 
(0.695) 
14.667 
(0.065) 
-0.153 
(0.062) 
3rd policy month 
(j=3) 
3.013 
(0.561) 
-0.030 
(0.565) 
6.171 
(0.213) 
-0.064 
(0.207) 
4th policy month 
(j=4) 
4.924 
(0.347) 
-0.053 
(0.314) 
6.348 
(0.261) 
-0.065 
(0.260) 
5th policy month 
(j=5) 
2.947 
(0.526) 
-0.030 
(0.515) 
3.139 
(0.256) 
-0.033 
(0.221) 
6th policy month 
(j=6) 
3.019 
(0.541) 
-0.033 
(0.511) 
8.242 
(0.293) 
-0.088 
(0.274) 
7th policy month 
(j=7) 
2.706 
(0.614) 
-0.030 
(0.573) 
2.621 
(0.460) 
-0.023 
(0.461) 
8th policy month 
(j=8) 
0.552 
(0.924) 
-0.007 
(0.908) 
1.952 
(0.562) 
-0.018 
(0.596) 
9th policy month 
(j=9) 
5.540 
(0.375) 
-0.052 
(0.407) 
2.222 
(0.619) 
-0.023 
(0.629) 
10th policy month 
(j=10) 
11.620 
(0.063) 
-0.125 
(0.093) 
2.140 
(0.692) 
-0.023 
(0.680) 
11th policy month 
(j=11) 
13.658 
(0.050) 
-0.145 
(0.040) 
1.216 
(0.666) 
-0.009 
(0.737) 
12th policy month 
(j=12) 
15.000 
(0.025) 
-0.148 
(0.038) 
0.707 
(0.871) 
-0.007 
(0.879) 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. All the values displayed above are the estimated coefficients of 
, ,C l j  and , ,BC l j . We test the conditional correlation between coverage and claim by , ,C l j . 
We test the correlation between insurance fraud and the business cycle by , ,BC l j . For each 
policy month (j, j=1~12), we estimate the condition correlation between claim (we test only for 
total theft claim here, hence k=h only.) and contract coverage (l, l=R represents replacement cost 
endorsement; l=ND represents no-deductible contract) using the two-stage method. In model (1’), 
we estimate the conditional correlation between total theft claim and the coverage of contracts 
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with replacement cost endorsement. In model (2’), we estimate the conditional correlation 
between total theft claims and the coverage of contract with no-deductible endorsement. 
When we conducted the two-stage conditional correlation analysis on the above 24 pairs, we 
applied the Hausman test to each of the 48 regressions. In all cases, the results do not reject the 
random effect model. 
